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SELF-EXECUTING AND NON SELF EXECUTING TREATIES
WHAT DOES IT MEAN?
Damos Dumoli Agusman*

Abstract
This article examines the concepts of self executing treaties and non-self executing treaties. These
two concepts are inadvertently related to the dualist and monist theory of international law. They
also relate to the question of direct applicability and municipal validity of treaties. This article will
show that non-self executing treaties are not always analogous with the concept of dualism under
international law. Likewise, treaties might presumably be self executing even in dualist states. It is
therefore imperative to acquire an understanding of these two concepts by discerning and analysing
them. Such understanding will provide clarity to the question of dualist transformation theory in
regards to the municipal validity of treaties. This article aims to explore these two concepts, in
particular their main ideas, how they relate and attempt to affect the theoretical problem of monism
versus dualism with regard to treaties. This article traces the origins of the concept of self-executing
treaties by examining it under American law and the European Union legal order as well as relevant
decisions by international courts. This article will then move to examine various scholars’ suggestion
to establish criteria for non-self executing treaties.

Keywords: self executing treaty, the law of treaties

I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of non-self executing has been discussed intensively by
scholars worldwide and it has been admitted that it is impossible to provide a satisfactory global and at once useful definition of what is meant
by it. Whether a treaty is or is not self-executing is arguably thought
to be a domestic law question. It would thus vary from state to state,
depending on different legal institutions and political considerations. 1
Meanwhile, there is a growing call to restrict the domestic discretion in
determining the non-self executing nature of the treaties.
* The Author acquired its Doctoral degree on International Law from the Goethe
University of Frankfurt and currently the Secretary to Directorate General for Legal
Affairs and Treaties, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia. This Article is entirely
his own personal and academic views. damos_agusman@yahoo.com
http://perjanjian-internasional.blogspot.com
1
Thomas Buergenthal, ‘Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Treaties in National
and International Law’, RdC (1992-IV), 368.
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The concept of non-self executing treaties is commonly associated
and confused with the notion of dualist stance toward treaties. Under
dualist theory, treaties bind on states, not in states. The treaty needs to
be translated (transformed) into domestic legislation first. It cannot be
directly applied domestically. Since dualism does not allow the selfexecuting effect of a treaty in the domestic law, it is easily held that
non-self executing is nothing but dualism. On the other hand, selfexecuting treaties are always seen as the product of monism since under
this theory treaties bind “on” as well as “in” states in a manner that
they can directly take effect in domestic law without requiring national
legislations.
The present article shall not explore in detail the problem and the
controversial legal construction underlying the concept as practiced by
states. It shall only explore its main idea, how it relates and attempts to
affect the theoretical problem of monism versus dualism with regard to
treaties. Despite the fact that the two notions do interface, it is necessary to determine whether the question of self-executing and non-selfexecuting shall be dealt with on the one hand, as an inherent part of
monist-dualist rubric, or on the other hand, shall be treated differently
and independently.
The two notions are inadvertently regarded along the same lines of
argument, and to some extent involve the monist-dualist debate due to
a common feature i.e. the critical role of domestic legislation to determine the validity of treaties under municipal law. The two concepts respectively involve the requirement of legislation and may therefore lead
to a similar indistinguishable effect. Therefore, for some scholars, the
notion of non-self-executing and self-executing becomes a question of
the domestic status of a treaty i.e. how and when a treaty may become
valid under municipal law. It is a self-executing one when it requires no
legislation and it is not when it requires legislations. In the case of the
latter, the judiciary cannot directly enforce its provisions in the absence
of implementing legislation. It is therefore commonly said that nonself-executing treaties have no domestic law status at all.
Confusion then arises when the two problems are pursued from the
same premise by which it may be induced that non-self-executing treaties, as they require legislation, refer to the concept of ‘transformation’
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that is familiar to dualism. The ambiguous and confusing term ‘self-executing’ used in the American debate refers to both ‘municipal validity’
(related to the adoption-transformation process) and ‘direct implementation/enforceable’ for which the absence of legislation is a key point.
Furthermore, it is also said that the distinction between self-executing
and non-self-executing treaties is one of domestic law only. In either
case, the treaty remains binding as a matter of international law.

II. ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPT OF SELF-EXECUTING TREATIES
The notion of self-executing and non-self-executing treaties originated in and was developed by the American legal system more than
a century ago2 when US Supreme Court Judge Marshall dealt with the
case of Foster vs. Neilson.3 The case determined that the Treaty between
the US and Spain on Amity, Settlement and Limits was non-self-executing. The reason was that the phrase - ‘shall be ratified and confirmed’ contained therein was the ‘language of contract’ and that the legislature
should execute the contract before it can become the rule for the Court.
Thereafter, the case Sei Fujii vs. State4 ruled that the California Alien
Land Law was invalid as it discriminated against Japanese landowners
and therefore was in conflict with the human rights provisions of the
UN Charter. The case raised questions whether or not the provisions of
the UN Charter invoked were self-executing. Since then, the doctrine
has become highly controversial and draws scholarly attention, including from outside the US.5
2

Yuji Iwasawa, ‘The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the US, A Critical Analysis’, 26 Va. J. Int’l. L. (1985-1986), 627.
3
Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829).
4
Sei Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481 (1950).
5
Some European scholars consider that the notion of non-self-executing rules is to a
certain extent doubtful and may give a false impression. These scholars include Rudolf Bernhardt, Bruno Simma, Michael Bothe, see discussion in Tunkin and Wolfrum
(eds), Walter Rudolf, ‘Incorporation of International Law into Municipal Law’, in
Grigory Tunkin and Rüdiger Wolfrum, International Law and Municipal Law (1988),
40-46. American scholars also discourage the use of this notion, such as Henkin who
sees the notion as a distortion of the US historic constitutional jurisprudence, see
Louis Henkin, ‘Implementation and Compliance: Is Dualism Metastasizing?’ 91 Am.
322
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The debate intensified when a proposed constitutional amendment,
the so-called ‘Bricker Amendment’ (sponsored by then Senator John W.
Bricker), was submitted and considered by the US Senate in the 1950s.
These amendments would have imposed restrictions on the scope and
ratification of treaties entered into by the US radically and would have
declared that a treaty shall become effective as domestic law in the
US only through the enactment of legislation. The proposed amendment failed in gaining support and was halted in 1954. The proposal
would have replaced the established principle of ‘treaties as the law of
the land’, which has been traditionally understood by earlier scholars
as ensuring their faithful observance without the aid or intervention of
legislation on the part of the States.6
The controversial debate revived in the Medellin case7, where the
US Supreme Court held that the judgment of the ICJ in the Avena case8
was not self-executing. While acknowledging that the obligation of the
US under Article 94 of the UN Charter to comply with the Avena judgment is a matter of international law, the Supreme Court found that the
language used in the Charter i.e. ‘undertake… to comply’ instead of
‘shall’ and ‘must’ was only a commitment on the part of the UN Members to take future action through political branches to comply with an
ICJ decision. The case has generated further uncertainty with regard to
the question of the domestic law status of non-self-executing treaties as
the Court has not made a clear distinction between the lack of domestic
law status and lack of judicial enforceability.9
Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. (1997), 517. Myers S. McDougal finds that the notion is essentially meaningless, and that the quicker it is dropped from our vocabulary the better
it is for clarity and understanding, see Lawrence Preuss, ‘The Execution of Treaty
Obligations Through Internal Law-System of The United States and of Some Other
Countries’, 45 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. (1951), 102.
6
Samuel B. Crandall, Treaties, Their Making and Enforcement (1916), 153.
7
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
8
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), ICJ Reports (2004), 12 (Judgment of 31 March 2004); see also Request for Interpretation of
the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mexico v. United States), ICJ Reports (2009), 3 (Judgment of 19 January
2009).
9
ASIL, ABA/ASIL Joint Task Force on Treaties in US Law, Report (16 March 2009),
11-12.
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The manner of American courts applying non-self-executing rules
which tends to leave their interpretation and application to the political organs of the government - the President or Congress - and applies
whatever decisions these organs may make, convinced some scholars
to equate the concept with nothing but the doctrine of ‘political questions’.10 The political question doctrine deals with the question of
whether or not the court system is an appropriate forum. As the courts
have authority only to hear and decide legal questions, a case that is a
political question will be declared non-justifiable and ultimately prohibits the courts to hear and decide it.
The concept of self-executing treaties, well known in the US, underwent a transforming conception in Europe. 11 European scholars and
practitioners term the notion as ‘direct applicability of treaties’ and were
initially seeking references from the PCIJ in Danzig,12 where it is held
that the Danzig-Polish agreement provided a right of action for Danzig
officials. The Court declared that the parties to a treaty might provide
rules creating individual rights and obligations, berita terbaru
dunia enforceable by the na- tional courts. Since then, self-executing
treaties were regarded in Europe as those creating individual rights
enforceable by the courts. Direct ap- plicability presupposes first of all
that the treaty can take effect within do- mestic law.13 It suffices to say
that a treaty, as determined by international law, is directly applicable
when it creates individual rights.
The notion ‘direct effect’ resembling ‘self-executing’ has been developed through European Community law with its own (supranational) characteristics. The concept was introduced by the European Court
since the 1960s when it held in the Van Gend en Loos case14 that Article
12 of European Economic Community Treaty produces direct effects
and creates individual rights which national courts must protect. Based
10

Quincy Wrights, ‘National Courts and Human Rights: The Fuji Case’, 45 AJIL
(1951), 64-65; Buergenthal (note 1), 382.
11
Yuji Iwasawa, ‘The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the US, A Critical Analysis’, 26 Va. J. Int’l. L. (1985-1986), 629.
12
Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, Advisory Opinion, 1928 PCIJ Series B, No.
15.
13
Albert Bleckmann, ‘Self-Executing Treaty Provisions’, in Rudolf Bernhardt, Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol. 4 (2000), 374.
14
Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration,
(1963) ECR 1.
324
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on national and European jurisprudence, a directly applicable concept
of treaties has developed in accordance with the special nature of the
European Union legal order, which should be distinguished from international law. It is presumed as a general rule, that all European laws
have a direct effect as it lays down the principle that its subjects are the
citizens who shall enjoy rights under the treaty. A treaty is directly applicable if a national court and national authorities can directly apply
it; if it establishes subjective rights and duties for the individual; and if
the individual can rely on it before national courts and national authorities. The rationale of the direct effect nature of European law is based
on dual vigilance15, where the Commission may bring an action against
its member states and individuals may demand the application of European law from their domestic courts.

III. DOMESTIC ENFORCEABILITy vS. MUNICIPAL VALIDITy
The developments mentioned above inadvertently created, to an extent, diverging understandings about the legal nature of self-executing
and non-self-executing treaties, which relates to the distinguished questions of direct enforceability and municipal validity. Foster vs. Neilson concerns the domestic judicial enforcement of treaties16 while the
‘Bricker Amendment’ is about municipal validity, which was suggested
to apply the transformation mode. The Medellin case seems to grasp
the two concepts and leave them undistinguished. Thereafter, the question of non-self-executing treaties has been discussed as covering both
direct enforceability and municipal validity of treaties.
It is then argued that if the issue of non-self-executing treaties does
not confine to a restrictive circumstance or if it is considered from the
15

Stephen Weatherill, Cases and Materials on EU Law (2007), 96.
Henkin underlined that Chief Justice John Marshall in the case did not contemplate
that some treaties might not be the law of the land. Marshall only found that some
promises by their character could not be ‘self-executing’, see Louis Henkin, ‘U.S.
Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker’, 89 AJIL
(1995) 2, 346-347. Henry said that the Chief Justice merely spoke of one case in
which a treaty would not be self-executing, that is, when one of the sovereign nations
promises to do an act, see Leslie Henry, ‘When is A Treaty Self-Executing’, 27 Mich.
L. Rev. (1929) 7, 777-778.
16
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perspective of validity instead of applicability of a treaty, the question
turns into a transformation-dualist and adoption-monist controversy. In
this regard, what occurs in the American debate concerning this issue
is, as Henkin17 claims, a moving jurisprudence directly from monism to
dualism, whereby it abandons a principal element of the constitutional
doctrine that treaties are law of the land, by declaring them to be nonself-executing.
The United States’s adherence to human rights conventions has attached to each of its ratifications a ‘package’ of reservations, understandings and declarations (RUDs), which are amongst others guided
by principle that every international human rights agreement should be
‘non-self-executing’.18 In ratifying the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights of 1966, for example, the United States declared:
The provisions of Articles 1 through 27 are not self-executing. This
declaration did not limit the international obligations of the United
States under the Covenant. Rather, it means that, as a matter “of
domestic law, the Covenant does not, by itself, create private rights
directly enforceable in U.S. courts.”19
It appears that such a declaration constitutes an application of the
transformation-dualist approach instead of determining a non-self executing treaty and is, as Henkin’s allegation above, against the monist
construction of Article VI of the United States constitution. The declaration has regarded all substantive norms non-self-executing indiscriminately without due regard for the merits of the given norms.20
Wildhaber21 also identifies confusion amongst scholars as too many
17

Louis Henkin, ‘Implementation and Compliance: Is Dualism Metastasizing?’ 91
Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. (1997), 517, 517.
18
Henkin, ibid, 341.
19
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of The Covenant, Initial reports of States parties due in 1993, Addendum, CCPR/C/81/Add.4,
para. 8.
20
Buergenthal claims the United States is applying an indiscriminate fashion in determining treaties as non-self-executing in order to embrace different grounds for
refusing to enforce a treaty as domestic law and is the only monist state where the
determination may depend on considerations other than the language of the treaties,
see Buergenthal (note 1), 368-383.
21
Luzius Wildhaber, Treaty-Making Power and Constitution: An International and
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use the term non-self-executing treaties without adequately defining it.
The concept is used to describe two different situations. First, treaties
are self-executing if the entry into force of the treaties under international law suffices to render treaties municipally binding and obligatory. In
this regard, one might be tempted to assume that for states subscribing
monist adoption treaties are self-executing, beri t a t erkini duni a
i nt ern as io n al while for those subscrib- ing dualist-transformation
treaties always non-self-executing.22 Second, a treaty is self-executing
if municipal courts can apply it immediate- ly without further
implementing acts to individuals. As the American common law has
hardly departed from the monist-dualist theoretical debate and
preferred the actual behaviour of municipal courts, the term of selfexecuting and non-self-executing treaties will refer to both situa- tions.
Through the approach one tends to seek directly which norms are
judicially enforceable or not in the municipal courts, thus covering both
questions in the same vein concerning direct enforceability and municipal validity. Practically, it seems difficult to assert that valid norms
cannot be enforceable as the courts only enforce norms that have been
part of municipal law.
The problem becomes exacerbated because the American Constitution theoretically subscribes to the adoption-monist approach for treaties, by which: all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby23. Unlike American law, British law finds the issue of self-executing and non-self-executing treaties less controversial because the transformation doctrine is
perfectly applied. Under this doctrine, legislations are in place for the
Comparative Study (1971), 226-227.
22
It is always argued that treaties have not been incorporated in the municipal law of
the United States because they are not self-executing, see Manley O. Hudson, ‘Charter Provisions on Human Rights in American Law’, 44 AJIL (1950) 3, 545. It is also
thought that there are treaties which are not immediately part of the law of the land
but require the aid of a statute, see Stefan A. Riesenfeld, ‘The Power of Congress and
the President in International Relations: Three Recent Supreme Court Decisions’, 25
Cal. L. Rev. (1936-1937) 643, 649-650. European scholars, which commonly use the
term ‘direct effect’ and ‘indirect effect’, identify indirect effect as applied in the many
states that require transformation into domestic law, see André Nollkaemper, National
Courts and the International Rule of Law (2011), 118.
23
Article VI, para. 2 Constitution of the United States.
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courts to enforce the transformed treaties’ norms. In the transformation
process parliament will cautiously ensure that the norms are phrased
and set to be self-executing and enforceable in the courts. But since the
inception of European Community law, the question corresponding to
non-self-executing treaties i.e. whether the provisions are directly applicable becomes very important in British law.
To avoid confusion, many scholars are therefore strongly of the
view that a clear distinction between the two is necessary in order to
acquire a clear understanding about what self-executing and non-selfexecuting treaties are meant to be. Some scholars24 criticize the tendency to confuse two issues and prefer to have them differentiated. Firstly,
formal validity (status) of treaties under municipal law (domestic incorporation issues), and secondly, the content of a treaty: whether it needs
intervention legislation or relies on a domestic operator or is directly
applicable. The first issue is whether and how treaties can be considered
to be binding under municipal law that results from the application of
the adoption-transformation doctrines. The second issue is about content and intent, or object and purpose that could only arise when under
the first issue the treaty has been determined valid in municipal law.25
In this regard the question on the non-self-executing and self-executing
nature of treaties is relevant only when it has been preliminarily determined that the treaty has been adopted or transformed in municipal law.
In line with this argument, Vazquez26 criticizes the tendency to read the
Medellin case as holding that a treaty is non-self-executing unless its
text clearly specifies that it has the force of domestic law.
24

J.A. Winter, ‘Direct Applicability and Direct Effect: Two Distinct and Different
Concepts in Community Law, 9 CML Rev. (1972), 428; Iwasawa (note 140), 635649; Benedetto Conforti, International Law and the Role of Domestic Legal System
(1993), 25; H. F. van Panhuys, ‘Relations and Interactions between International and
National Scenes of Law’, 112 RdC (1964-II), 79; Swan Sik Ko, ‘International Law in
the Municipal Legal Order of Asian States: Virgin Land’, in Ronald St. J. MacDonald
(ed.), Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya (1994), 739; Buergenthal (note 1), 318-319;
Nollkaemper (note 22), 130-134; Carlos Manuel Vázquez, ‘Treaties as Law of the
Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties’, 122 Harv. L.
Rev. (2008), 652-654.
25
V.T. Thamilmaran, ‘International Law and National Law: Element of Automatic
Incorporation’, 11 Sri Lanka J. of Int’l L (1999), 237-238.
26
Manuel Vázquez (note 24), 652.
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The question of direct effect has also been addressed vaguely by the
judgment of the ICJ in the case of Avena of 2009 on the Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 200427, especially on the direct
effect status of obligations imposed upon the US as set out in paragraph
153 (9)28 of the judgment of 2004. In addressing the question, the ICJ appeared to be hesitant to make any clear legal position on the question of
direct effect. In paragraph 44 of the 2009 judgment, it stated:
The Avena Judgment nowhere lays down or implies that the courts
in the United States are required to give direct effect to paragraph
153 (9). The obligation laid down in that paragraph is indeed an
obligation of the result which clearly must be performed unconditionally; non-performance of it constitutes internationally wrongful
conduct. However, the Judgment leaves it to the United States to
choose the means of implementation, not excluding the introduction
within a reasonable time of appropriate legislation, if deemed necessary under domestic constitutional law. Nor moreover does the
Avena Judgment prevent direct enforceability of the obligation in
question, if such an effect is permitted by domestic law.
Albeit encountering the question of direct effect, the Court seems to
keep silent on various questions underlying the concept. It does neither
clarify whether the judgment could decide the direct effect status of an
international obligation, nor does it pronounce a convincing view that
domestic law could determine such direct effect quality. The paragraph
suggests two conflicting clues. First, that the ICJ through its judgment
may lay down that a state is required to give direct effect to an international obligation, for which the Court did not do so in the Avena Case.
Second, the means of implementation of a judgment may have direct
27

Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), ICJ
Reports (2004), 12 (Judgment of 31 March 2004); see also Request for Interpretation
of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mexico v. United States), ICJ Reports (2009), 3 (Judgment of 19 January
2009).
28
Paragraph 153 (9) states: ‘(f)inds that the appropriate reparation in this case consists in the obligation of the United States of America to provide, by means of its own
choosing, review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences of the
Mexican nationals referred to in subparagraphs (41), (51), (6) and (75) above, by
taking account both of the violation of the rights set forth in Article 36 of the Convention and of paragraphs 138 to 141 of this Judgment’.
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effect status, as long as it is permitted by domestic law. It has been arguably presumed that the statement demonstrates a tendency to merge
the concept of non-self-executing/direct effect with that of the issue of
transformation mode.29
It would, however, be difficult to derive any clear guidance from
the paragraph because the Court has at no time clearly defined what it
means by the term ‘direct effect’ when linked to the related concept of
modes of incorporation of obligation into domestic law.30 Discussions
among US scholars clearly ascribed the term to the problem of non-selfexecuting obligation that has long been debated. The interchangeable
use of the terms has created confusion among scholars. The judgment
added to this confusion because in the same paragraph another term
is introduced i.e. ‘direct enforceability’ without clarifying whether the
term refers to the same concept as ascribed by the term ‘direct effect’.
On this point, a careful reading of the judgment on the Avena case
quoted above will reveal that it is not really questioning the validity
of the ICJ original judgment of 2004 within the US domestic law, but
merely emphasises that the means of implementation of the ICJ i.e.
paragraph 153 (9) shall be left entirely to the US. Unlike the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) Van Gend en Loos case, the ICJ appeared to escape the question of direct effect of paragraph 153 (9) and clearly stated
that it was not decided by the original judgment. For that reason the ICJ
thus declined to give an interpretation. In paragraph 44 the ICJ stated
that: In short, the question is not decided in the Court’s original Judgment and thus cannot be submitted to it for interpretation under Article
60 of the Statute.
The hesitancy of the ICJ to provide legal enlightenment on the
question of direct effect was regretted by Judge Sepulveda Amor in
his dissenting opinion through the argument that there existed different
interpretations of the parties as to the domestic effects of an international obligation for which the ICJ should have had jurisdiction. The
Court could have made an important contribution to the development
29

Nollkaemper (note 22), 119.
Winter prefers to reserve the term ‘direct applicability’ for the method of incorporation into the municipal law, and the terms ‘direct effect’ to describe when the provisions is judicially enforceable, see A. Winter (note 24), 425-426.
30
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of international law by settling the issues raised by the conflicting interpretation. 31 The judgment thus keeps the controversy surrounding the
non-self-executing question undetermined.
The direct enforceable and non-self-executing rules are common in
every case of law application and may occur in municipal rules of dualist and monist states. Most scholars submit that if the term ‘non-selfexecuting treaties’ is meant to be not capable of being executed in the
absence of additional implementing measures, it may also be equally
applicable to other legislations or constitutions.32 Many provisions of
national legal orders are not capable by themselves to be executed without some additional legislation. A non-self-executing provision is not
a question that exclusively relates to treaties but a common problem
associated with the norms. Likewise, treaties might presumably be selfexecuting in dualist states if an implementing legislation has been provided or adequate before ratification.33
Evan34 argued that in Foster vs. Neilson the courts held that legislative implementation is necessary for the confirmation of land titles
which were not perfected prior to the cession of territory to the United
States and for the grant of patents to public lands of the United States.
Whereas public lands might be sold by the President under the terms of
a treaty, the money could not be disposed of without prior approval of
Congress. So as a matter of content, the rule, albeit valid under municipal law, could not by its own term become applicable under municipal
law and therefore requires legislation to make it enforceable. In this
perspective, the legislation was intended to make the rule enforceable
before the court, not to transform it into domestic law.
31

Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States)
(note 27) Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sepulda Amor, para. 37-43.
32
A provision of the United States Constitution which empowers the Congress of the
United States ‘to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries’ is too general and requires a patent and a copy right legislations for
them to be enforceable in a Court, see Buergenthal (note 1), 369.
33
Lawrence Preuss, ‘On Amending The Treaty-Making Power: A Comparative Study
of The Problem of Self-Executing Treaties’, 51 Mich. L. Rev. (1952-1953), 1124.
34
Alona E. Evans, ‘Some Aspects of the Problem of Self-Executing Treaties’, 45 Am.
Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. (1951) 66, 73.
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IV. CRITERIA FOR NON-SELF-EXECUTING TREATIES
The confusion arising from various views regarding the term has
prompted a clearer definition for self-executing treaties particularly
when explaining the nature of legislation involved. It strongly suggests
that the nature of legislation as required for the purpose of making provisions of treaties self-executing is an ‘implementing’ one instead of an
‘adopting’ or a ‘transforming’ one. In an attempt to provide a clearer
working definition Evans35 defines self-executing treaties as, generally
speaking, those which can be executed by force of their own terms;
those which require no implementation by Congress; and those which
are addressed to the courts. Kelsen36 envisages clearly this very notion
by stating that a norm of international law which is applicable by the organs of the states without further implementation by national law may
be called a self-executing norm. The legislation that might be required
for a non-self-executing treaty is aimed at implementing the already
valid rules rather than to give validity to the rules. Such implementing
legislation, in this respect, shall be distinguished from transformation,
which is aimed at giving validity effect to that norm.
O’Connell37 put emphasis to the implementation of legislation as
distinguishing self-executing from non-self-executing. He described
the distinction as between two kinds of treaties: those intended to fall
within the purview of municipal courts, and those which leave it to
implementing municipal legislation to carry their purpose into effect.
Panhuys38 also advocates the same line of argument by saying that the
expression ‘non-self-executing’ means that the rule is phrased so that
further enactments are required for its implementation.
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, 1948, has been commonly cited as describing a need of further implementing legislation, as Article V prescribes that:
35

Evans (note 34), 74.
Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (2003), 401-447; Edwin Bochard,
‘The Relation between International Law and Municipal Law’, 27 VA. L. Rev. (1940)
2, 194-196. He further states that only norms of international law providing for administrative or judicial acts need transformation, this only if the administrative or
judicial organs are bound by constitution to apply solely national law.
37
Daniel P. O’Connell, International Law, vol. 1 (1970), 56.
38
van Panhuys (note 24), 76-77.
36
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The parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective
Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or of any of the other
acts enumerated in Article III.
Article V would seem to suggest that the treaty is not self-executing
in the sense that upon its ratification, prosecution could not be instituted
in the municipal courts before the relevant criminal code would have to
be amended.
Nonetheless, a survey of literatures suggests that the meaning of
self-executing and non-self-executing treaties recently already tends to
confine to municipal applicability instead of municipal validity of treaties. Controversies surrounding the notions remain unsettled. Scholars
have not yet agreed on determining the criteria for which treaties are
and which are not self-executing, and to what extent international law
or national law could play a decisive role for its determination.
In dealing with criteria, scholars have made extensive attempts to
generalize treaties that require implementing legislation. Leary39 identified three relevant criteria used by American courts and scholars to determine when a provision of a treaty required implementing legislation:
(1) intention of the parties, (2) the precision and detail of language employed, and (3) whether the subject matter relates to powers belonging
to the legislative or executive branches rather than the judicial branch.
However, Leary acknowledges that the criteria hardly applied with sufficient consistency to make an accurate prediction likely. Scharchter40
finds it difficult to draw clear criteria and identifies that there are only
two clear situations where a treaty provision requires legislative action before it can become effective: (1) where the treaty has an explicit
provision to this effect and (2) where the power to deal with the subject
of the treaty is vested solely in the legislature, as for example a provision calling for criminal penalties or requiring a direct appropriation
39

Virginia A. Leary, International Labour Conventions and National Law: The Effectiveness of The Automatic Incorporation of Treaties in National Legal Systems
(1982), 57-63.
40
Oscar Schachter, ‘The Charter and The Constitution: The Human Rights Provisions
in American Law’, 4 Vand. L. Rev. (1950-1951), 645-646.
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of money. Outside of these two categories, it does not seem possible
to generalize regarding the kind of treaties which require legislative
implementation: each case must be examined on its own merits in order
to determine whether the treaty provision may become presently effective without awaiting further legislation.
Vazquez41 draws four doctrines to explain why a treaty might be
judicially unenforceable in the municipal courts:
1) The parties (or perhaps the U.S. treaty makers unilaterally) made it
judicially unenforceable. This is primarily a matter of intent.
2) The obligation it imposes is of a type that, under our system
of separated powers, cannot be enforced directly by the courts.
This branch of the doctrine calls for a judgment concerning the
allocation of treaty-enforcement power as between the courts and
the legislature.
3) The treaty makers lack the constitutional power to accomplish
by treaty what they purported to accomplish. This branch of the
doctrine calls for a judgment about the allocation of legislative
power between the treaty makers and the lawmakers.
4) It does not establish a private right of action and there is no other legal
basis for the remedy being sought by the party relying on the treaty.
Unlike the first three categories of non-self-executing treaties, a
treaty that is non-self-executing in the fourth sense will be judicially unenforceable only in certain contexts. These four issues are sufficiently
distinct and require sufficiently differing analyses, so that they should
be thought of as four distinct doctrines.
Instead of drawing criteria, some prefer to enlist subject matters
of treaties that are inevitably non-self-executing and for which implementing legislation is required. Kelsen42 acknowledges that the norm of
international law may require implementation by norms of national law
such as declaring war, determining the competent organs, extradition,
determining administrative and judicial organs, determining punishment and penalty. He further indicates that all the norms of international
law imposing obligations or conferring rights upon states commonly re41

Carlos Manuel Vázquez, ‘The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties’, 89 AJIL
(1995) 4, 695-723.
42
Kelsen (note 36), 193-194.
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quire implementation by national law. However, if the national law already contains the norm that makes the application of international law
possible, no further implementation is necessary. Likewise, it is also
commonly considered as non-self-executing if treaties obligate a state
to pay money to a foreign state or to foreign parties, create criminal law,
or provisions are too vague or open-ended such as programmatic character. Wright43 has attempted a classification, and distinguishes three
classes of non-self-executing treaties; (1) treaty provisions dealing with
finances; (2) treaty provisions which require for their performance detailed supplementary legislation or specific acts which the Constitution
provides shall be performed by Congress (e.g., incorporation of territory, organization of offices and courts, and declaration of war); and
(3) treaty provisions which are by nature self-executing, but because of
historical tradition and constitutional interpretation require legislation
to be executed (e.g., treaties defining crimes).
A survey of American court cases by Buergenthal44 has suggested
that certain subjects matters will prompt treaties to be non-self-executing such as if its enforcement without specific implementing legislation
would make the treaty unconstitutional, what are deemed to be exclusive
legislative powers, and patent law. On the other hand, treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation, granting most favoured-nation status,
commercial matters, extradition, trademark, etc., are self-executing.
Scholars are also divided when dealing with the question as to
whether such determination is governed by international law or municipal law. Winter45 asserts that the question of direct enforceability of
treaty provisions is primarily, if not exclusively, a problem of international law. Panhuys46 also argues that the determination of self-executing or non-self-executing natures shall be sought mainly by reference
to international law and disagreed with the Dutch Supreme Court in
its ruling that the answer must exclusively be sought in international

43

Quincy Wright, The Control of American Foreign Relations (1922), 354-355.
Buergenthal (note 1), 381-382.
45
J.A. Winter, ‘Direct Applicability and Direct Effect: Two Distinct and Different
Concepts in Community Law, 9 CML Rev. (1972), 428.
46
van Panhuys (note 24), 79.
44
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law.47 A contrasting view is advocated by Buergenthal,48 arguing that it
is domestic law that determines whether the treaty creates rights which
domestic courts are empowered to enforce in a state. The similar view
is shared by van Dijk49 who holds that, as a rule, it is for the domestic court to decide whether a treaty provision is self-executing or not.
However van Dijk noted, as an exception, that it may well be that the
treaty itself contains prescriptions to that effect thus such as the then
Article 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU). Article 288 provides that a regulation made by the Council or
Commission ‘shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in
all Member States’.
Consequently, if the status of self-executing or non-self-executing
treaties is determined by domestic law, it would be impossible to provide
a useful definition to the terms because such determination will vary according to the given state. A non-self-executing provision in one state
might be self-executing in another state. The full reliance exclusively
on municipal law in making such a determination in an unrestrictive
manner and without objective criteria will lead to a situation where the
merits of the treaty - the intention, the precision and detail of language
employed - are not necessarily determinative. It may even induce states
to decide all treaties are non-self-executing status indiscriminately in
order to refuse the applicability of a treaty’s provision on the basis of
non-juridical ones, such as national interest. If such a situation occurs
it is no longer a matter of self-executing or non-self-executing treaties
in the sense of direct enforceability but becomes a question of domestic
validity, by which the transformation-dualist doctrine is actually coming into play.
In order to avoid political manoeuvring where a state does not wish
to apply the treaties’ norms simply because they are undesirable, contrary
to national interest, introducing progressive values, or are viewed suspi47

In 1962, the Hoge Raad (Dutch Supreme Court) ruled that the question whether a
treaty provision is directly applicable or not is a question of treaty-law rather than a
question of Netherlands law, see Judgment of May 18, 1962, Bosch GmbH N.V. v. de
Geus en Uitdenbogerd, HR., 1965 N.J. No. 115.
48
Buergenthal (note 1), 317.
49
Pieter van Dijk and Bahiyyih G. Tahzib, ‘Parliamentary Participation in the TreatyMaking Process of the Netherlands’, 67 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. (1991), 420.
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ciously by the internal judge purely by reason of their origin, Conforti50
takes a cautious approach towards norms that owe their non-self-executing nature in order to impose more restrictions on the criteria for treaties
to be non-self-executing. They are confined only to rules of two kinds.
First, those that do not create any obligations for the state but merely allow for discretionary power, for example, states may draw straight baselines under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Second, those which, even as they create obligations, cannot be implemented
because the necessary organs or mechanisms have not been developed.
For example, Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 concerning the right to appeal a criminal conviction.
It has been found inapplicable by Italian and Dutch courts where a higher
court has not been created. He refuses to accept any other criteria as they
may be arbitrary and carry political consideration.
A set of criteria has also been developed by the Van Gend en Loos
case, as quoted above, to determine a direct applicable treaty. It has currently been formulated as containing three conditions: (1) the provision
must be clear and precise, (2) it must be unconditional, (3) its operation
must not be dependent on further action being taken by Community or
national authorities. However, it has been argued that this set of criteria appears to be applied more strictly when dealing with international
agreements than when determining the direct applicability of Community law. For the latter, there appears to be a presumption in favour of
direct applicability.51
However, Van Gend en Loos case and the subsequent case Costa
v. ENEL52 established a new principle where the Court found that the
European Economic Community (EEC) - then European Community
or EC - Treaty differed from ordinary international treaties and made
quite clear that Community law creates rights directly enforceable by
individuals in the national courts of the member states.53 Thereafter, the
50

Benedetto Conforti, International Law and the Role of Domestic Legal System
(1993), 27.
51
Pierre Pescatore, ‘The Doctrine of ‘Direct Effect’: An Infant Disease of Community
Law’, 8 Europ. L. Rev. (1983), 177.
52
Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L., (1964) ECR 585, E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 585
(Preliminary Ruling).
53
Buergenthal (note 1), 330.
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national courts of the European Union pursued a different approach
when encountered with identical provisions i.e. between Article III of
the GATT Agreement and Article 95 (1) of EEC Treaty. As revealed in
the past, German courts refused to recognize the direct application of
the GATT Agreement by arguing that while the GATT Agreement was
an international treaty in the classical sense regulating economic relations amongst states, the EEC Treaty created its institution structure on
which member states conferred, within a limited area, powers which
the institution may exercise independently.54 The creation of some of
its articles of direct rights and duties for the nationals of the member
states was an effect distinct from the concept of self-executing provisions in ordinary international treaty.55 The member states of the Community have accepted the theory of the Community Court that by joining the European Union they transferred to it certain of their sovereign
rights and legislative powers in order to remove obstacles to the direct
applicability of Community law.56 The case may perfectly explain that
the same wordings in the different instruments may be interpreted differently under different legal orders, which is eventually beyond the
content criteria.
The scholarly endeavours to establish objective criteria to draw a
line between treaties that are and are not self-executing have not yet
provided a satisfactory result. The difficulty is not only that it will depend on the municipal law determination, which will vary from one
state to another, but also on the fact that the decision should be pursued
on a case-by-case basis before the courts. In the US the problem has
become the subject of contentious debates between nationalist and transnationalist approaches.57 The involvement of political and self-interest
54

Gerhard Bebr, ‘Directly Applicable Provisions of Community Law: Development
of Community Concept’, 19 Int’l & C.L.Q. (1970) 2, 258-259.
55
Stefan A. Riesenfeld, ‘The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and GATT: A Notable German Judgment’, 65 AJIL (1971) 3, 549.
56
Buergenthal (note 1), 329.
57
The scholarly discussion on treaty enforcement in the United States has been highlighted by two mutually negated approaches between nationalists and transnationalists.
Nationalists hold that treaties lack domestic legal force in the absence of implementing legislation, courts should interpret treaties in accordance with executive branch
policy preference, and that treaties do not create individually enforceable rights, and
that the judiciary is not responsible for providing remedies for violation of a treaty. In
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considerations to such a determination have added to the existing complex problem pertaining to the concept, which would affect the good
faith principle enshrined in the law of treaties. The different approaches
pursued by US and German courts in cases58 involving the interpretation of Article 36, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963
have shown how the same provisions have been interpreted contrastingly by the courts of the two states, and have therefore resulted in contrasting outcomes. Consequently, the enjoyment of an individual right
conferred by the same treaty varies from one state to another.

V. CONCLUSION
Following the arguments put forward above, it suffices to conclude
that the survey of literature suggests that the discussion regarding the
notion non-self-executing treaties has increasingly been confined to the
problem of municipal enforceability and therefore is distinguished from
the question on municipal validity of treaties. In dealing with the very
notion, it must be presumed that the given treaties have already been
afforded municipal status either through the application of adoption or
transformation modes. The question at hand is whether or not a specific
treaty provision is capable on its own terms to be applied in municipal
law. It will be determined through relevant circumstances by means
of international law and municipal law with the view of determining
whether or not implementing legislation is still required. The determicontrast, transnationalists hold that treaties have the status of law in the United States,
that courts should interpret treaties in accordance with international law, that treaties
protect individual rights, and that the judiciary is responsible for providing remedies
to individuals whose treaty rights are violated, see David Sloss, ‘When Do Treaties
Create Individually Enforceable Rights? The Supreme Court Ducks the Issue in Hamdan and Sanchez-Llamas’, 45 Colum. J. Transnat’l. L. (2006) 1, 29-37.
58
Having contrasted Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon and the German Bundesverfassungsgericht in the consolidated cases decided on 19 September 2006 (2 BvR 2115/01), it
has been commonly concluded by scholars that the two Courts steered very different
courses, see Carsten Hoppe, ‘Implementation of LaGrand and Avena in Germany and
the United States: Exploring a Transatlantic Divide in Search of a Uniform Interpretation of Consular Rights’, 18 EJIL (2007) 2; Jana Gogolin, ‘Avena and SanchezLlamas Come to Germany – The German Constitutional Court Upholds Rights under
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations’, 8 GLJ (2007) 3.
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nation will involve international law focusing on the content or nature
of the treaty obligation, stipulation, and the intent of the state parties;
and municipal law dealing with the question whether and under what
circumstances such enforcement requires devoted legislative action to
accomplish this aim.
Applying the non-self-executing rule indiscriminately, arbitrarily
and without fully taking into account the terms or nature of the given
provisions will only dilute and complicate the already-existing distinction of methods of granting municipal validity of treaties (monist
adoption and dualist transformation). It will entail a conviction that the
question of non-self-execution is nothing but the question as envisaged
by the dualist transformation theory and, therefore, will constitute an
unnecessary repetition to the already long-lasting discussion about the
same issue.
The question of self-executing treaties becomes inevitable when
treaties overlap with municipal law i.e. when both regulates the same
subjects such as, in the case of American law, human rights. What was
traditionally governed by municipal law is now also governed by international law. As treaty law nowadays enters into an area that was traditionally under the exclusive domain of municipal law, such as human
rights norms, not all treaty norms could by their own terms be applicable in municipal law without the aid of implementing legislation. Human rights treaties commonly create rights of individuals against their
own state, which traditionally belong exclusively under municipal law.
Such rights will inevitably involve an establishment of municipal legal
framework and institutions, which would be out of reach of treaties.
In this regard, implementing legislations are necessary to fill the area
beyond the scope of the treaties and within this perspective, non-selfexecuting provisions of a treaty should be meant as incomplete provisions and therefore incapable for domestic implementation.
The question of municipal validity shall therefore be distinguished
from the problem of non-self-executing treaties. The former is a matter
of legal policy pursued by a state in dealing with the question of the
relationship of treaties and municipal law, which shall be, as a matter
of option, determined by its municipal law. The latter is not a matter of
option but a problem of legal determination, which, albeit partly deter340
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mined by discretionary measure based on municipal law, should also
rely on the terms of the treaty’s provisions. It is a juridical question
and the answer should carry legal consideration which justifies that a
treaty’s norm is non-self-executing.
The non-self-executing nature is also invoked to prevent the intrusion of international law into municipal law in the upsurge of constitutional resistance towards international law in the American legal system. Such intrusions have already been considered to adversely affect
the legislative power, which traditionally enjoyed privileges in creating
rights and obligations of individuals. While it is the right of states to
enforce policy to prevent the intrusion of norms of treaties into municipal law, such policy should not abuse the very nature of the question of
non-self-executing treaties, which is a purely juridical one. It is worth
observing that by declaring a provision of a treaty non-self-executing, a
state is not denying the rights and obligations thereof but merely delaying their enforcement pending the issuance of implementing legal measures. In this regard, when a state under its municipal law determines a
treaty is non-self-executing, it shall automatically follow that such state
is under international obligation to take legal measures to implement
the provision municipally as intended by the parties. Failure to do so
will constitute a violation of its international obligations.
What is now required is merely developing a set of objective criteria
to determine whether a treaty is non-self-executing in a restrictive manner, on the basis of the presumption that once a treaty becomes the law
of the land it will be self-executing unless the nature of its provisions
dictates otherwise. Different results of the same provision of a treaty
arising from the application of different non-self-executing rules by the
parties to a treaty will constitute an unfair situation regarding performances of state parties in carrying out their international obligations.
A survey of municipal practices suggests that implementing legislations are required when:
1) Treaties provide norms but according to the respective constitutional
law such norms should be given effect only by municipal legislation,
such as creating a criminal offence rule.
2) Treaties establish permissive or discretionary rules and shall be
determined by the respective states, such as to declare that they are
Volume 11 Number 3 April 2014

341

Jurnal Hukum Internasional

archipelagic states.
3) Treaties require states to make a prescribed municipal act such as
determining base lines for the measuring of maritime zones.
REFERENCES
Books and Journals
Gerhard Bebr, ‘Directly Applicable Provisions of Community Law: Development of
Community Concept’, 19 Int’l & C.L.Q. (1970) 2, 258-259.
Albert Bleckmann, ‘Self-Executing Treaty Provisions’, in Rudolf Bernhardt, Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol. 4 (2000), 374.
Edwin Bochard, ‘The Relation between International Law and Municipal Law’, 27
VA. L. Rev. (1940) 2, 194-196
Thomas Buergenthal, ‘Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Treaties in National
and International Law’, RdC (1992-IV), 368.
Benedetto Conforti, International Law and the Role of Domestic Legal System
(1993), 27 Constitution of the United States
Samuel B. Crandall, Treaties, Their Making and Enforcement (1916), 153 ASIL,
ABA/ASIL Joint Task Force on Treaties in US Law, Report (16 March 2009),
11-12
Pieter van Dijk and Bahiyyih G. Tahzib, ‘Parliamentary Participation in the TreatyMaking Process of the Netherlands’, 67 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. (1991), 420.
Jana Gogolin, ‘Avena and Sanchez-Llamas Come to Germany – The German Constitutional Court Upholds Rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations’, 8 GLJ (2007) 3
Louis Henkin, ‘Implementation and Compliance: Is Dualism Metastasizing?’ 91 Am.
Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. (1997), 517
Louis Henkin, ‘U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker’, 89 AJIL (1995) 2, 346-347
Leslie Henry, ‘When is A Treaty Self-Executing’, 27 Mich. L. Rev. (1929) 7, 777-778
Manley O. Hudson, ‘Charter Provisions on Human Rights in American Law’, 44
AJIL (1950) 3, 545
Carsten Hoppe, ‘Implementation of LaGrand and Avena in Germany and the United
States: Exploring a Transatlantic Divide in Search of a Uniform Interpretation of
Consular Rights’, 18 EJIL (2007) 2
Yuji Iwasawa, ‘The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the US, A Critical Analysis’, 26 Va. J. Int’l. L. (1985-1986), 627
Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (2003), 401-447
Swan Sik Ko, ‘International Law in the Municipal Legal Order of Asian States: Virgin Land’, in Ronald St. J. MacDonald (ed.), Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya
(1994), 739 Virginia A. Leary, International Labour Conventions and National
Law: The Effectiveness of The Automatic Incorporation of Treaties in National
Legal Systems (1982), 57-63
342

Volume 11 Number 3 April 2014

Self-executing and non self executing treaties

André Nollkaemper, National Courts and the International Rule of Law (2011), 118
Daniel P. O’Connell, International Law, vol. 1 (1970), 56
H. F. van Panhuys, ‘Relations and Interactions between International and National
Scenes of Law’, 112 RdC (1964-II), 79
Pierre Pescatore, ‘The Doctrine of ‘Direct Effect’: An Infant Disease of Community
Law’, 8 Europ. L. Rev. (1983), 177
Lawrence Preuss, ‘The Execution of Treaty Obligations Through Internal LawSystem of The United States and of Some Other Countries’, 45 Am. Soc’y Int’l L.
Proc. (1951), 102
Stefan A. Riesenfeld, ‘The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and GATT: A Notable
German Judgment’, 65 AJIL (1971) 3, 549
Stefan A. Riesenfeld, ‘The Power of Congress and the President in International Relations: Three Recent Supreme Court Decisions’, 25 Cal. L. Rev. (1936-1937)
643, 649-650
Oscar Schachter, ‘The Charter and The Constitution: The Human Rights Provisions in
American Law’, 4 Vand. L. Rev. (1950-1951), 645-646
David Sloss, ‘When Do Treaties Create Individually Enforceable Rights? The Supreme Court Ducks the Issue in Hamdan and Sanchez-Llamas’, 45 Colum. J.
Transnat’l. L. (2006) 1, 29-37
V.T. Thamilmaran, ‘International Law and National Law: Element of Automatic Incorporation’, 11 Sri Lanka J. of Int’l L (1999), 237-238
Carlos Manuel Vázquez, ‘The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties’, 89 AJIL
(1995) 4, 695-723
Carlos Manuel Vázquez, ‘Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and
the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties’, 122 Harv. L. Rev. (2008), 652-654
Stephen Weatherill, Cases and Materials on EU Law (2007), 96
Luzius Wildhaber, Treaty-Making Power and Constitution: An International and
Comparative Study (1971), 226-227
J.A. Winter, ‘Direct Applicability and Direct Effect: Two Distinct and Different Concepts in Community Law, 9 CML Rev. (1972)
Tunkin and Wolfrum (eds), Walter Rudolf, ‘Incorporation of International Law into
Municipal Law’, in Grigory Tunkin and Rüdiger Wolfrum, International Law and
Municipal Law (1988), 40-46
Quincy Wright, The Control of American Foreign Relations (1922), 354-355.
Quincy Wrights, ‘National Courts and Human Rights: The Fuji Case’, 45 AJIL (1951),
64-65

Case Laws
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), ICJ Reports (2004), 12 (Judgment of 31 March 2004);
Bosch GmbH N.V. v. de Geus en Uitdenbogerd, HR., 1965 N.J. No. 115
Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829)
Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L., (1964) ECR 585, E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 585 (Preliminary
Volume 11 Number 3 April 2014

343

Jurnal Hukum Internasional

Ruling)
Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, Advisory Opinion, 1928 PCIJ Series B, No. 15
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of
31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States), ICJ Reports (2009), 3
(Judgment of 19 January 2009)
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon and the German Bundesverfassungsgericht in the consolidated cases decided on 19 September 2006 (2 BvR 2115/01)
Sei Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481 (1950) Van Gend en Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, (1963) ECR 1

344

Volume 11 Number 3 April 2014

